The Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act of 1994, usually called the FAAAA, is a federal statute. Despite its name, its effect reaches well beyond aviation. The FAAAA contains a preemption provision that addresses state regulation of motor carriers and freight brokers. Because of that provision, the FAAAA can affect whether certain claims brought under Georgia state law may proceed. Understanding the FAAAA’s impact requires looking at what it preempts, what it preserves, and how a recent United States Supreme Court decision has clarified the line.
What preemption means
Preemption is a principle rooted in the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution. When Congress legislates within its authority, federal law can displace conflicting state law. Where a federal statute preempts a category of state law, a claim that falls within that category cannot proceed under state law, even in a state court.
The FAAAA contains an express preemption provision. Congress enacted the FAAAA in part to prevent a patchwork of differing state economic regulations that Congress concluded made interstate trucking inefficient.
What the FAAAA preempts
The FAAAA’s preemption provision broadly bars a state from enacting or enforcing a law, regulation, or other provision having the force and effect of law that is related to a price, route, or service of a motor carrier or a broker with respect to the transportation of property.
The phrase related to a price, route, or service is the heart of the provision. It reflects Congress’s intent to keep states from imposing economic regulation that would dictate how carriers and brokers price, route, or perform their transportation services. State laws that directly regulate those subjects fall within the preemption.
The safety exception
The FAAAA does not preempt everything a state does that touches trucking. The statute contains an exception, commonly called the safety exception. Under that exception, the FAAAA’s preemption provision does not restrict the safety regulatory authority of a state with respect to motor vehicles.
This exception preserves a substantial area of state authority. States retain the ability to address the safe operation of motor vehicles on their roads. The exception is the reason that ordinary state law continues to govern many trucking-related disputes despite the FAAAA’s broad preemption language.
Why this matters for Georgia personal injury claims
Most Georgia truck accident claims are ordinary negligence claims. An injured person alleges that a truck driver, or a motor carrier, breached a duty of care and caused a collision. Claims of this kind concern the safe operation of motor vehicles and are generally understood to fall within, or alongside, the safety concerns that the FAAAA’s safety exception preserves. The FAAAA was not designed to eliminate the traditional tort system for highway crashes, and routine negligence suits against drivers and carriers continue to be litigated under Georgia law.
The FAAAA question has been most contested in a narrower setting: claims against freight brokers. A freight broker arranges transportation by matching shippers with motor carriers, but the broker does not itself operate the truck. When an injured person sues a broker, alleging that the broker negligently selected an unsafe carrier, the broker has historically argued that such a claim is related to a broker’s service and is therefore preempted by the FAAAA. Courts across the country divided on whether the safety exception saved these negligent-selection claims.
The Supreme Court’s 2026 decision
The United States Supreme Court resolved this division. In a decision issued on May 14, 2026, the Court held that the FAAAA does not preempt state-law claims that a freight broker negligently selected an unsafe motor carrier.
The Court reasoned that requiring a broker to use ordinary care in choosing a motor carrier concerns motor vehicles, most directly the trucks that will transport the goods. Because such a claim concerns motor vehicles, it falls within the FAAAA’s safety exception, and the exception saves the claim from preemption.
The practical effect of this decision is significant for Georgia litigation. A negligent-selection claim against a freight broker, brought under Georgia negligence law, is no longer subject to dismissal on the ground that the FAAAA preempts it. Such claims may proceed and move into the discovery phase, where the facts about how the broker selected the carrier are developed. Brokers can no longer rely on the FAAAA alone to obtain an early exit from this category of case.
What remains preempted
The 2026 decision addressed negligent-selection safety claims. It did not erase the FAAAA’s preemption provision. State laws and claims that genuinely amount to economic regulation of a carrier’s or broker’s prices, routes, or services, and that do not concern motor vehicle safety, can still be preempted. The dividing line continues to turn on whether a given state law or claim concerns the safety of motor vehicle operation, which the safety exception preserves, or instead regulates the economic terms of transportation service, which the FAAAA’s preemption provision targets.
Summary
The FAAAA is a federal statute that preempts state laws related to the price, route, or service of motor carriers and brokers, but it contains a safety exception that preserves a state’s authority over motor vehicle safety. For Georgia, ordinary negligence claims arising from truck crashes continue to be governed by state law. The most contested question, whether negligent-selection claims against freight brokers were preempted, was resolved by the United States Supreme Court on May 14, 2026, which held that such claims fall within the safety exception and are not preempted. State laws that function as economic regulation of prices, routes, or services, without concerning motor vehicle safety, may still be preempted.
Disclaimer
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