Freight brokers and freight forwarders are intermediaries in the trucking industry. A broker arranges for the transportation of cargo by connecting a shipper with a motor carrier but does not itself transport the goods. A freight forwarder assembles and consolidates shipments and assumes responsibility for transportation, often using carriers it hires. When a truck crash occurs, an injured party may ask whether one of these intermediaries can be named as a defendant in a Georgia lawsuit. The answer involves both Georgia tort law and a federal preemption question that has recently changed.
The Theory of Liability Against an Intermediary
A broker or forwarder typically is not the entity whose driver was operating the truck. Liability against an intermediary therefore usually rests on a theory of direct negligence rather than on the conduct of the driver. The most common theory is negligent selection, sometimes called negligent hiring of a carrier. The argument is that the broker or forwarder failed to exercise reasonable care in choosing the motor carrier and selected a carrier that it knew or should have known was unsafe, unqualified, or noncompliant with federal safety requirements.
A separate question is whether the intermediary exercised enough control over the transportation to be treated as something more than an arranger. In some cases a plaintiff argues that an intermediary functioned as a motor carrier or as a joint venturer, or that an agency relationship existed. These theories depend on the specific facts of how the shipment was arranged and supervised.
The Federal Preemption Issue
For years, the major obstacle to claims against freight brokers was federal preemption. The Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act, often called the FAAAA, preempts state laws related to a price, route, or service of a broker or motor carrier. The statute contains a safety exception that preserves the safety regulatory authority of a state with respect to motor vehicles.
Federal courts divided on whether a state-law negligent selection claim against a broker was preempted, and if so, whether the safety exception saved it. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, whose decisions apply to federal courts in Georgia, held in Aspen American Insurance Co. v. Landstar Ranger, Inc. that a negligent selection claim against a broker was preempted and that the safety exception did not save it. Other circuits reached the opposite conclusion, producing a recognized circuit split. As a result, for several years federal courts in Georgia, including the Middle District of Georgia, dismissed negligent selection claims against brokers as preempted.
The Recent Change in the Law
The legal landscape changed in 2026. In a unanimous decision issued in May 2026, the United States Supreme Court resolved the circuit split and held that the FAAAA does not preempt state-law claims that a freight broker negligently selected an unsafe motor carrier. The Court concluded that such negligent selection claims fall within the FAAAA’s safety exception. This ruling supersedes the earlier Eleventh Circuit position and applies nationwide, including in Georgia courts.
The practical effect is that the federal preemption barrier that previously blocked many broker negligence claims has been removed. A negligent selection claim against a broker is no longer foreclosed by FAAAA preemption.
What Still Must Be Proven
The removal of the preemption barrier does not mean a claim against a broker or forwarder automatically succeeds. The injured party still must prove the elements of negligence under Georgia law. This means showing that the intermediary owed a duty of reasonable care in selecting the carrier, that it breached that duty, and that the breach was a proximate cause of the crash and the resulting injuries.
Evidence relevant to such a claim often includes what the broker knew or could readily have learned about the carrier, such as the carrier’s federal safety rating, its history of violations, its operating authority and insurance status, and information available through federal databases. A claim is stronger where the chosen carrier had clear, accessible safety problems that a reasonably careful broker would have discovered and acted upon.
Freight Forwarders and Carrier-Like Conduct
Freight forwarders occupy a somewhat different position than pure brokers because a forwarder generally assumes responsibility for the transportation and may be treated more like a carrier. Where an intermediary’s conduct shows that it exercised the kind of control associated with a motor carrier, additional theories of liability may apply, and the analysis turns on the actual relationship rather than the label used in the paperwork.
Apportionment of Fault
Georgia’s apportionment statute, O.C.G.A. § 51-12-33, applies when multiple parties share responsibility for a crash. If a broker or forwarder is found partly at fault alongside the carrier, the driver, or others, the trier of fact assigns a percentage of fault to each, and damages are divided accordingly.
Summary
Claims against freight brokers and freight forwarders are allowed in Georgia truck accident lawsuits, most often under a negligent selection theory. The federal preemption defense that long stood in the way of broker negligence claims was removed by the United States Supreme Court’s 2026 decision holding that the FAAAA does not preempt negligent selection claims against brokers. An injured party must still prove the ordinary elements of negligence under Georgia law, and any fault found against an intermediary is apportioned among all responsible parties under O.C.G.A. § 51-12-33.
Disclaimer
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