This guide explains how Georgia law treats two distinct categories of conduct that sometimes appear together in a single crash: the failure of an occupant to wear a seat safety belt, and the operation of a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol. It also addresses how Georgia’s comparative negligence and apportionment statutes interact with those two issues. The discussion is general and is not directed at any individual situation.
The seat belt statute
Georgia’s seat belt requirement is codified at O.C.G.A. § 40-8-76.1. The statute requires each front-seat occupant of a passenger vehicle, and any minor at least eight years of age in any seat, to be restrained by a seat safety belt. The defined term “passenger vehicle” reaches pickup trucks, vans, and sport utility vehicles designed to carry 15 passengers or fewer. Adult non-compliance is punishable by a fine of not more than $15.
A separate subsection of the same statute was for many years known as the “seat belt gag rule.” It prohibited evidence of seat belt non-use from being introduced in a civil action to prove negligence, causation, or any other liability question.
What SB 68 did in 2025
On April 21, 2025, Governor Brian Kemp signed Senate Bill 68 into law. SB 68 amended O.C.G.A. § 40-8-76.1 by removing the gag rule for civil actions commenced on or after that date. In a covered action, the trier of fact may now consider evidence that an occupant failed to wear an available seat safety belt. The amendment authorizes that evidence to be considered on issues of negligence, comparative negligence, apportionment of fault, assumption of risk, causation of injuries, and other liability and damages issues. The trial court retains discretion under the rules of evidence to exclude such evidence when its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.
The change is prospective: it applies to actions commenced on or after April 21, 2025. For actions filed before that date, the older form of the statute generally continues to govern.
Driving under the influence in Georgia
Driving under the influence is prohibited by O.C.G.A. § 40-6-391. The statute makes it unlawful for any person to drive or be in actual physical control of any moving vehicle while under the influence of alcohol to the extent that it is less safe for the person to drive, while under the influence of any drug, or with a blood alcohol concentration of 0.08 percent or higher for non-commercial drivers and 0.02 percent for drivers under 21 years of age. The threshold for commercial vehicle operators is 0.04 percent.
A DUI offense is a separate criminal matter. A conviction is reached in criminal court under the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard. A civil case arising from the same collision proceeds separately under the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard.
A criminal conviction can have evidentiary value in a later civil action arising from the same conduct. Under O.C.G.A. § 24-8-803(22), a final judgment of conviction entered after trial or upon a plea of guilty is generally admissible to prove any fact essential to sustain the judgment in certain civil cases. A plea of nolo contendere is treated differently in some contexts. The precise admissibility of conviction evidence in a given case is governed by the rules of evidence and by court rulings.
Comparative fault and apportionment
Modified comparative negligence in Georgia is set out at O.C.G.A. § 51-12-33. A plaintiff whose share of fault is less than 50 percent recovers damages reduced in proportion to that share. A plaintiff who is 50 percent or more at fault is barred from recovery. The trier of fact apportions fault among parties and non-parties under the same statute.
O.C.G.A. § 51-11-7 separately provides that a plaintiff who by ordinary care could have avoided the consequences of the defendant’s negligence is not entitled to recover for the avoidable portion.
A driver’s intoxication can have several distinct effects within this framework. It is generally evidence of negligence per se, because the operation of a motor vehicle while under the influence violates a safety statute designed to protect the class of persons that includes other road users. In some cases involving wantonness, intoxicated driving has been treated as a basis for an award of punitive damages under O.C.G.A. § 51-12-5.1.
A seat belt question and a DUI question can both appear in the same case. After SB 68, a defendant may raise an occupant’s seat belt non-use as an issue bearing on apportionment or on injury causation in actions commenced on or after April 21, 2025. The intoxication of a driver, by contrast, ordinarily bears on the driver’s own fault for the collision. The jury, under the trial court’s instructions, allocates fault between the parties and any responsible non-parties.
Special situations involving passengers and drinking
Two Georgia doctrines sometimes appear in cases involving an intoxicated driver and a passenger.
The first is the assumption-of-risk doctrine. Georgia courts have addressed situations in which a passenger knowingly accepts a ride with an obviously intoxicated driver. Whether assumption of risk applies depends on the passenger’s actual knowledge of the driver’s condition and on whether the passenger appreciated the specific risk. The analysis is fact-intensive.
The second is the negligent-entrustment doctrine. Under Georgia case law, the owner of a vehicle who entrusts it to a driver who is known to be incompetent or impaired may be subject to liability for harm caused by the entrusted driver. That doctrine is directed at the entrustor, not at the passenger.
After SB 68, seat belt non-use is one more strand that can be raised in such cases. None of these doctrines, by itself, decides the outcome; each is one input into the broader apportionment analysis under O.C.G.A. § 51-12-33.
The statute of limitations
The two-year period under O.C.G.A. § 9-3-33 governs personal injury actions arising from motor vehicle collisions in Georgia. Property damage to personalty has a four-year period under O.C.G.A. § 9-3-32. Loss of consortium has a four-year period under § 9-3-33.
Tolling provisions can pause the period. O.C.G.A. § 9-3-90 tolls the period during the time an injured person is a minor or legally incompetent. O.C.G.A. § 9-3-94 tolls the period during a defendant’s absence from the state. O.C.G.A. § 9-3-99 addresses tolling during a related criminal prosecution, subject to a six-year outer cap. The pendency of a DUI prosecution arising from the same conduct can therefore have a tolling effect within the bounds of that statute, but the precise application depends on the facts.
How the parts of the question relate
The original question groups two distinct types of conduct.
The first is the seat belt question. It is governed by O.C.G.A. § 40-8-76.1, as amended by SB 68 in 2025. Whether seat belt non-use can be considered in a civil action depends on whether the action was commenced on or after April 21, 2025, and on the trial court’s evidentiary rulings.
The second is the driver-impairment question. It is governed by O.C.G.A. § 40-6-391 on the criminal side and by ordinary negligence principles, the negligence per se doctrine, and the punitive damages statute O.C.G.A. § 51-12-5.1 on the civil side.
The two questions are linked, but they sit on separate legal tracks, and the apportionment of fault among parties and non-parties under O.C.G.A. § 51-12-33 is the mechanism that brings them together for a jury’s consideration.
This guide is general information about Georgia law as of 2026. The application of any statute or doctrine depends on the specific facts of a case and on later legal developments.
Disclaimer
This article is provided strictly for general educational and informational purposes. It is intended to explain how Georgia law works as a matter of public legal education, and it does not constitute legal advice, a legal opinion, or a recommendation about any particular course of action. Reading this article, or contacting the website on which it appears, does not create an attorney-client relationship between the reader and any law firm, attorney, or author.
The law changes over time. Statutes, regulations, court rules, and judicial decisions discussed here may have been amended, repealed, superseded, or reinterpreted after the date of publication, and citations to specific code sections or cases reflect the law only as it was understood when this article was written. The application of any legal principle also depends heavily on the specific facts and circumstances of an individual matter, and outcomes vary from case to case.
For these reasons, no one should rely on this article as a substitute for advice from a licensed Georgia attorney who can review the particular facts involved. The author and publisher make no warranty, express or implied, regarding the accuracy, completeness, timeliness, or applicability of the information provided, and disclaim any liability for any action taken or not taken based on this content.