Freight brokers arrange the transportation of goods by connecting shippers with motor carriers, but they do not own trucks or employ drivers themselves. When a truck operated by a carrier the broker selected is involved in a crash in Georgia, an injured person may ask whether the broker, and not just the carrier, can be held responsible. The answer involves both Georgia negligence law and a federal statute that for years complicated these claims.
The negligent selection theory
A claim against a broker is usually framed as negligent hiring or negligent selection. The theory is that the broker had a duty to exercise ordinary care when choosing a motor carrier, and that it breached that duty by retaining a carrier it knew or should have known was unsafe or noncompliant. Indicators of a noncompliant carrier can include a poor federal safety rating, a record of serious violations in the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration’s data, lapsed or insufficient insurance, an inactive operating authority, or a pattern of crashes.
Under ordinary Georgia negligence principles, a plaintiff pursuing this theory must show a duty, a breach of that duty, causation, and damages. The broker’s conduct is measured against the standard of ordinary care, meaning the care a reasonably prudent broker would have used in selecting a carrier under the same circumstances. The plaintiff must also connect the broker’s selection decision to the harm, showing that the carrier’s noncompliance or unfitness was a proximate cause of the crash and injuries.
The federal preemption question
For years, brokers responded to negligent selection claims by invoking the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act of 1994, known as the FAAAA. That statute, part of Congress’s deregulation of the trucking industry, preempts state laws related to a price, route, or service of a motor carrier or broker with respect to the transportation of property. Brokers argued that a state negligence claim attacking how they selected carriers was a law “related to” their services and therefore preempted.
The FAAAA also contains a safety exception, which preserves the authority of states to regulate the safety of motor vehicles. Plaintiffs argued that negligent selection claims fell within this exception. Federal courts, including courts addressing claims arising in Georgia, split on the issue. Some held that negligent hiring and selection claims against brokers were preempted and not saved by the safety exception, while others reached the opposite conclusion. The result was years of uncertainty.
The 2026 Supreme Court decision
The United States Supreme Court resolved the split in a unanimous decision issued in May 2026. The Court held that state negligent selection claims against freight brokers are not preempted by the FAAAA. The Court reasoned that requiring a broker to exercise ordinary care in choosing a carrier concerns the motor vehicles that will haul the goods, and that the claim therefore falls within the FAAAA’s safety exception. Because the safety exception applies, the preemption that would otherwise shield brokers gives way, and these claims may proceed under state law.
The practical effect is significant. Brokers can no longer expect to exit this kind of litigation early through a motion to dismiss grounded in FAAAA preemption. Negligent selection claims are now more likely to move into discovery, where the broker’s records of how it vetted and monitored a carrier become central.
What a plaintiff must still prove
The Supreme Court decision removed a preemption defense, but it did not make brokers automatically liable whenever a carrier they selected causes a crash. A negligent selection claim still has to be proven under Georgia law. The plaintiff must establish that the broker failed to exercise ordinary care in selecting the carrier, that the carrier was in fact unfit or noncompliant, and that this failure was a proximate cause of the injuries. A broker that checked publicly available safety data, confirmed active operating authority and adequate insurance, and documented its selection process has evidence that it exercised ordinary care. The mere fact that a carrier later caused a crash does not, standing alone, establish negligence by the broker.
Brokers, carriers, and other parties
It is worth distinguishing the broker’s potential liability from that of other parties. The motor carrier itself remains directly responsible for its drivers and equipment, and a carrier can be vicariously liable for the negligence of a driver acting within the scope of employment. A broker that exercised enough control over the transportation to function as a carrier or employer may face liability on additional theories beyond negligent selection. Georgia’s apportionment statute, O.C.G.A. § 51-12-33, also governs how fault is divided among multiple responsible parties, so a broker found partly at fault would generally be assigned a share of the damages corresponding to its share of fault.
Summary
A shipping broker can be held liable in Georgia for negligently selecting a noncompliant motor carrier. The negligent selection theory rests on the broker’s duty to use ordinary care in choosing a carrier. The FAAAA preemption defense that once clouded these claims was rejected by the United States Supreme Court in 2026, which held that such claims fall within the statute’s safety exception. Liability still depends on proof that the broker failed to exercise ordinary care and that the failure proximately caused the harm.
Disclaimer
This article is provided strictly for general educational and informational purposes. It is intended to explain how Georgia law works as a matter of public legal education, and it does not constitute legal advice, a legal opinion, or a recommendation about any particular course of action. Reading this article, or contacting the website on which it appears, does not create an attorney-client relationship between the reader and any law firm, attorney, or author.
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